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TOURO LAW REVIEW
Burton court held that defendant's request could not be "considered
a clear and unequivocal request to represent himself throughout the
entire trial" .273
The Himko court found that nothing in the defendant's complaint
that suggested he wished to proceed pro se.274 The court noted that
"the right to self representation lacks the force and urgency of the
right to counsel and there is no necessity to inform every defendant
of his right to conduct his own defense."275
Both the Federal and the New York State Constitutions guarantee
a criminal defendant the absolute right of counsel. Federal and
New York State cases have consistently found that this right
includes the right to proceed pro se, however there are limitations
to this right. New York State has found one such limitation is that
the trial courts are not obligated to inform the defendant of his right
to proceed pro se.
SUPREME COURT
QUEENS COUNTY
People v. Bell 276
(printed June 16, 1997)
Defendant, George Davis Bell, was indicted for numerous
crimes including two counts of murder in the first degree; murder
in the second degree; attempted robbery in the first degree;
burglary in the second degree; and criminal possession of a
weapon in the second and third degrees. 277 He moved to dismiss
273 id.
274 People v. Hirnko, 657 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128 (3d Dep't 1997).
27I d. (citing People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 17, 324 N.E.2d 322, 327,
364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 844 (1974); People v. Burton, 106 A.D.2d 652, 653, 482
N.Y.S.2d 909 (2d Dept 1994)).
276 N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, 32 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1997).
277 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (first degree murder); § 125.25 (second
degree murder); § 110.00 (second degree attempted robbery); § 140.25
(second degree burglary); § 265.02 (second degree criminal possession of a
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the indictment pursuant to New York CPL § 210.20 (1)(c) 7 8 and
CPL § 210.35 (4)279 on the grounds that he was deprived of his
constitutional and statutory right to testify before the grand jury
in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution,2" Article I, Section 6 of the New York State
Constitution,2 ' and New York CPL § 195.50 (5),2" among
others.
weapon); and § 265.03 (third degree criminal possession of a weapon)
(McKinney 1997).
n Bell, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, 32; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.20
(1)(c) (McKinney 1997). This section provides in pertinent part: "After
arraignment upon an indictment, the superior court may, upon motion of the
defendant, dismiss such indictment... upon the ground that: [t]he grand jury
proceeding was defective, within the meaning of section 210.35." Id.
279 Bell, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at 32; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.35
(4) (McKinney 1997). This provision states: "A grand jury proceeding is
defective within the meaning of paragraph (c) of subdivision one of section
210.20 when. . . [t]he defendant is not accorded an opportunity to appear or
testify before the grand jury in accordance with the provisions of section
190.50." Id.
280 Bell, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at 32; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The
Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part that: "In all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the ight... to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id.
21 Bell, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at 32; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Article I,
section 6 provides in pertinent part that:
No person shall be held to answer to for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime ... unless on indictment of a
grand jury, except that a person... may waive an
indictment by a grand jury and consent to be prosecuted ....
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as
in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses
against him.
Id.
I Bell, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at 32; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 190.50(5)(a)(McKinney 1997). This section provides in pertinent part:
When a criminal charge against a person is... submitted to
a grand jury, such person has a right to appear before such
1998 1127
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Defendant contended that he was deprived of effective
assistance of counsel in deciding on whether or not to testify
before the grand jury because the People failed to: (1) respond to
requests made by him prior to the grand jury presentment for
advance notice as to whether the People intended to present all
known exculpatory and mitigating statements and charge certain
legal instructions to the jury; and (2) disclose whether oral or
written statements were going to be used against him and his co-
defendants."' Jury instructions requested by defendant included
intoxication, extreme emotional disturbance, the grand jury's
historical mercy function, 2  voluntariness of statements, lesser
included offense, and specific prior intent to commit robbery as
required elements of the crimes charged. 6  In addition,
defendant claimed that since this was a capital case, "heightened
due process" entitled him to those instructions. 287  Finally,
defendant argued that the District Attorney's disclosure of
portions of the grand jury proceeding constituted a waiver of any
claim of grand jury secrecy. 288
grand jury as a witness in its own behalf... and... the
district attorney must notify the defendant or his attorney of
the prospective or pending grand jury proceeding and accord
the defendant a reasonable time to exercise his right to
appear as a witness therein.
Id.
" Bell, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at 32. Defendant also moved to dismiss
the indictment on the grounds that he was deprived of his constitutional rights
under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal
Constitution and Article I, sections 2, 5 and 11 of the New York State
Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. V, VIII, XIV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, §§ 2,
5, 11.
Bell, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at 32.
See People v. Prater, 170 Misc. 2d 326, 330, 648 N.Y.S.2d 228, 230
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1996) (citing People v. Sullivan, 68 N.Y.2d 495, 510
N.Y.S.2d 518 (1986) (noting that the grand jury's historical "mercy function"
allows the Court to exercise mercy in certain instances by indicting a defendant
for manslaughter in the second degree rather than for intentional murder).
2"6 Bell, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at 32.
7 Id.
2 Id. at 32.
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Rejecting defendant's claims, the court held that while a
defendant is entitled to notice of his right to testify and an
opportunity to be heard,29 which he received, there is no
statutory or other authority for the pre-indictment requests sought
by defendant. 290 In addition, the limited information provided to
defendant regarding the crimes for which he would be charged,
did not alter the statutory duty to maintain grand jury secrecy,
and did not constitute a waiver of grand jury proceedings. 29'
On December 26, 1996, the defendant was arraigned on the
felony complaint. 2' Defendant waived release from custody," 3
and both sides agreed that the grand jury would not vote before
January 16, 1997.2' The case was presented to the grand jury on
January 17, 1997, twenty two days after the arraignment.' The
defendant failed to appear and was indicted for the felonies as
charged.296 Subsequently, the defendant contended that he was
deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to effective
assistance of counsel, because absent pre-indictment "disclosure"
289 Id. (See N.Y. CrM. PRoc. LAw § 190.50 (5); People v. Choi, 210
A.D.2d 495, 496, 620 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132 (2d Dep't 1994) (denying
defendant's objection that he was deprived of his right to testify before the
grand jury since defense counsel received written notice of additional charges
being brought against defendant's son and the People held the case open for
approximately two weeks to give defense counsel time to locate defendant);
People v. Pugh, 207 A.D.2d 503, 615 N.Y.S.2d 912 (2d Dep't 1994) (holding
that four days notice to defense counsel of the People's intention to present the
case to Grand Jury accorded defendant reasonable time to exercise his right to
testify)).2I Bell, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at 32.
291 Id.
' Id.
293 Id. N.Y. CRi. PRoc. LAw § 180.80. This provision provides for the
release of defendant from custody upon the failure of timely disposition of
felony complaint. Id.2
'4 Bell, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at 32.
295 id.
296 Id. Defendant was indicted on two counts of murder in the first degree;
murder in the second degree; attempted robbery in the first degree; burglary in
the second degree; and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third
degrees. Id. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.27, 125.25, 110.00, 140.25,
265.02, and 265.03 (McKinney 1997).
1998 1129
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by the prosecution, he was unable to come to an informed
decision whether he should testify before the grand jury.297
In rejecting defendant's claims, the court emphasized the
importance of the statutory requirement of grand jury secrecy. 298
Among its important virtues, the court noted, grand jury secrecy
safeguards the independence of the grand jury, prevents the flight
of the accused and encourages free disclosure of information by
those summoned before it.29 However, the trial court may, in its
297 Bell, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at 32.
298 Id. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.25 (4) (a) (McKinney 1997).
This provision provides in pertinent part:
[N]o grand juror, or other person ... may, except in the
lawful discharge of his duties or upon written order of the
court, disclose the nature or substance of any grand jury
testimony, evidence or any decision, result or other matter
attending a grand jury proceeding .... Nothing contained
herein shall prohibit a witness from disclosing his own
testimony.
Id.
299 Bell, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at 32 (citing People v. DiNapoli, 27
N.Y.2d 229, 265 N.E.2d 449, 316 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1970)). In DiNapoli, the
Court of Appeals set forth five frequently mentioned considerations for
maintaining secrecy of grand jury minutes:
(1) prevention of flight by a defendant who is about to be
indicted; (2) protection of the grand jurors from interference
from those under investigation; (3) prevention of subornation
of perjury and tampering with prospective witnesses at the
trial to be held as a result of any indictment the grand jury
returns; (4) protection of an innocent accused from
unfounded accusations if in fact no indictment is returned;
and (5) assurance to prospective witnesses that their
testimony will be kept secret so that they will be willing to
testify freely.
Id. at 235, 265 N.E.2d at 452, 316 N.Y.S.2d at 625-26. The DiNapoli
court then applied these criteria to determine that the court below was
justified in using its discretion to make an exception to the grand jury
secrecy requirement, by allowing a copy of the minutes of a grand jury
proceeding to be furnished to a public commission more than two years
after the conclusion of grand jury proceedings, the conviction of the
defendants by guilty pleas and the payment of fines. Id. Consequently, the
court held that such allowance presented no danger of escape by persons
1130 [Vol 14
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discretion, direct disclosure when the public interest benefit
outweighs the public interest in maintaining secrecy.) °
Nevertheless, such disclosure, the court held, does not alter the
statutory duty to maintain grand jury secrecy.3"' New York
Criminal Procedure Law section 190.25 (4)(a) provides that the
"[n]ature or substance of any grand jury testimony, evidence or
any decision, result or other matter attending a grand jury
proceeding. . . " may not be disclosed by a prosecutor except in
the lawful exercise of his duties. 3
Furthermore, the court held, discovery in a criminal case is
entirely covered by statute.0 3 In a similar case, Hynes v.
Cirigliano,3 it was held that the defendant was not entitled to see
his videotaped statements before he was indicted since he was not
a person entitled to discovery under New York Criminal
Procedure Law section 240.20. 305 The court followed the Hynes
who may be indicted, no interference with the grand jury's freedom to
deliberate and no need to protect any innocent accused person. Id.
300 Bell, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at 32 (citing In re District Attorney of
Suffolk County, 58 N.Y.2d 436, 488 N.E.2d 440, 461 N.Y.S.2d 773(1983)).
The Suffolk County court held that grand jury secrecy is not absolute,
explaining that a disclosure may be directed when a balancing of the public
interest favors disclosure over secrecy. In re District Attorney of Suffolk
County, 58 N.Y.2d 436, 444, 488 N.E.2d 440, 443-44, 461 N.Y.S.2d 773,
776-77. However, the court noted that "[s]ince disclosure is the 'exception
rather than the rule,' one seeking disclosure first must demonstrate a
compelling and particularized need for access." Id.
301 N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at 32; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.25 (4)(a)
(McKinney 1997).
302 N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at 32 (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
190.25 (4)(a) (McKinney 1997)).
3 Id. (referring to N.Y. CRIMi. PROC. LAW § 240; See also People v.
Copicotto, 50 N.Y.2d 222, 406 N.E.2d 465, 428 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1980)).
3w 180 A.D.2d 659, 579 N.Y.S.2d 171 (2d Dep't 1992) (holding that since
defendant was not yet indicted, he was not described by section 240.20 of the
New York Criminal Procedure Law as a person entitled to discovery).
305 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.20. This section provides in pertinent part
that:
[Ulpon demand to produce [information] by a
defendant ... against whom and indictment ... is pending,
the prosecutor shall disclose to the defendant and make
available for inspection... any written, recorded or oral
1998 1131
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reasoning in concluding that pre-indictment disclosures requested
by the defendant as to the details of matters before the grand jury
prior to his indictment would interfere with the body's freedom to
deliberate. 3°  In addition, permitting such disclosures would
convert the investigative nature of the presentment into an
adversarial proceeding or mini-trial.
307
The court here also relied on the Court of Appeals decision,
People v. Valles,308 in support of its conclusion that the defendant
is not entitled to advanced notice as to whether mitigating
defenses such as extreme emotional disturbance will be
charged.3 9 Valles involved a defendant who was indicted for
statement of the defendant... transcript of
testimony... written report or document... photograph or
drawing relating to the criminal action or ... any tapes or
other electronic recordings....
Id.
o Bell, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at 32.
I d. (citing People v. Lancaster, 69 N.Y.2d 20, 503 N.E.2d 990, 511
N.Y.S.2d 559 (1986). In Lancaster, the Court of Appeals relied on Article I,
§ 6 of the New York State Constitution and relevant precedent. Id. at 25, 503
N.E.2d at 992, 51 N.Y.S.2d at 561. The court held that the People had no
duty to disclose psychiatric evidence which would have supported possible
defenses in a case involving attempted murder and assault charges. Id. It
noted that while the grand jury is only required to find reasonable cause to
believe the accused committed the crime based on the evidence presented, the
petit juror must find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 26, 503 N.E.2d at
993, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 562. Therefore, the People do not "have the same
obligation of disclosure at the grand jury stage as they have at the trial stage."
Id. Rather, "[t]he extent of the prosecutor's obligation to instruct the Grand
Jury on a particular defense depends upon whether that defense has the
'potential for eliminating a needless or unfounded prosecution."' Id. at 27,
502 N.E.2d at 994, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 563. See also People v. Suarez, 122
A.D.2d 861, 505 N.Y.S.2d 728 (2d Dep't 1986) (holding that "[t]he Grand
Jury proceeding is not intended to be adversarial in nature or a minitrial").
The prosecution is not obligated "to present every piece of evidence which
they possess against a suspect in a Grand Jury proceeding." Id. at 862, 505
N.Y.S.2d at 729. It is only required not to withhold any information that
would have materially influenced its investigation. Id.
3w 62 N.Y.2d 36, 464 N.E.2d 418, 476 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1984).
309 Bell, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at 32.
1132 [Vol 14
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second-degree murder.31 He challenged the indictment on the
ground that the prosecutor failed to instruct the grand jury
concerning the affirmative defense of extreme emotional
disturbance. 3" Although the court in Valles noted that in some
situations a failure to furnish adequate instructions may result in a
defective indictment, it held that the prosecution is not required to
provide the grand jury with every potential defense.3
Finally, the court rejected defendant's claim that it should
deviate from established legal precedent by extending the concept
of "heightened due process" to grand jury proceedings in
potential capital cases.313 It noted that all the courts of concurrent
jurisdictions have declined to apply a heightened standard at the
preliminary stages of a case, including grand jury proceedings.3"4
For example, in People v. Prater,3 5 the court rejected the
defendant's contentions that because the case potentially involved
the death penalty that he was constitutionally and statutorily
entitled to a heightened due process standard.316 Similar to Bell,
defendant requested that she be entitled to material to assist her to
decide whether to testify before the grand jury and to help her
prepare her testimony.37 The court denied this request, saying
that the defendant is not entitled to be forewarned about the
potential dangers involved in the event that she does decide to
testify before the grand jury. 3" Because the right is statutorily
granted, there are no constitutional implications to a defendant's
decision to testify at a grand jury proceeding.3 9 In effect, a
310 Valles, 62 N.Y.2d at 37, 464 N.E.2d at 418, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
311 Id. at 36-37, 464 N.E.2d at 418-19, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 50-51.
312 Id.
313 Bell, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1997, at 32.
314 Id.
315 People v. Prater, 170 Misc. 2d 327, 648 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1996).
316 Id.
317 Id. at 329-30, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
318 Id. at 330, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
324 Id. at 329, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 229. However, the court noted that in an
effort to avoid unnecessary prosecution for murder in the first degree, that it
would depart from the current trend in case law and hold that the grand jury
1998 1133
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defendant must be able to anticipate the possibility that cross
examination or testimony by others might affect the juror's
assessment of her credibility, without additional information
provided by the prosecution.
In summary, the applicable New York statutes and case law do
not support the defendant's federal and state constitutional claims
for a "heightened due process" standard in grand jury
proceedings involving capital cases. In adhering to New York
precedent, the courts emphasize the importance of maintaining
the investigatory and confidential nature of grand jury
proceedings. Consequently, unless a court in its discretion
determines that such disclosure would be in the public interest,
the prosecution is not required to disclose any information that
may assist a defendant in deciding whether to testify at the grand
jury. In addition, the prosecution is not required to disclose any
information to the grand jury regarding affirmative defenses,
except that which is necessary to avoid unfounded prosecution.
Since discovery is entirely governed by New York's statutory
scheme, a defendant's pre-indictment rights in New York are far
more limited than those accorded to a defendant during post-
indictment proceedings.
should be made aware of affirmative defenses such as extreme emotional
disturbance. Id. at 332, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
120 Id. at 330, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 229-30.
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